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To reduce environmental impact of transport and congestion, several kinds of 
innovations can play an important role. In the literature on innovations it has often been  
concluded that a traditional top-down, vertical process might  be less successful than a 
more horizontal, systemic approach in which many actors are involved. This paper 
focuses on successful innovations in transport that have been realised. Seven case 
studies were carried out, focusing on the goals, the role of actors, the role of research, 
and the instruments used. The main conclusions of the research are firstly that the 
services described can certainly result in local improvements as to  nuisance from 
parked vehicles, and   noise and air pollution caused by moving cars.  Secondly, the 
local municipalities have played an important role in the introduction of the new 
services. Thirdly, in some cases the role of only one person (or a few persons) had a 
huge impact  on  the introduction of the services. Fourthly, in several cases the solution 
was not  so much in expensive, high-tech measures, but in very simple though creative 
ways of using existing possibilities. Fifthly, the role of research differs considerably 
among the innovations, sometimes being of crucial importance, but sometimes hardly 
relevant. Sixthly, all functions that play a crucial role in the management of present-day 
innovation processes, as presented by Smits and Kuhlmann (2002), appear in some, 
though not in all cases. The management of interfaces brought actors together. The 
organising systems often did not exist before. Learning and experimenting  played an 
important role in several cases. The demand articulation was very important in some of 
the cases: the services were organised starting from the perspective of the users. The 
role of providing an infrastructure for strategic intelligence in the cases has been 
limited. Introduction 
Transport fulfils a crucial role in modern society. In Western countries households 
spend on average 10 to 15% of their income on transport.  Besides people travel 60 to 
75 minutes per day (Schafer, 1998). A substantial part of government expenditure is 
related to transport (investments in infrastructure, subsidies for public transport etc.). In 
2001, for example, the total budget of  the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works 
and Water Management was about 5 billion euro (about 1.5 % of GDP).  However it is 
questionable if these figures fully express the importance of transport for society. 
Transport is necessary to bridge the distance between different activities, making this 
demand for transport a derived demand, rather than a demand of the activity in itself. 
Modern societies cannot function without transport. 
 
Passenger transport needs are mainly met by motorised transport modes using fossil 
fuels, while the transport of goods is almost completely reliant on these modes. 
Motorised transport has important external effects. Emissions of pollutants lead to poor 
air quality and acidification and emission of CO2 are probable causes of climate change. 
Other external effects include noise, accidents and congestion. Forecasts for the next 2 
to 3 decades show that both passenger and goods transport are expected to increase 
substantially. The share of the fast but relatively energy-consuming modes are likely to 
increase. In the Netherlands technological improvements will not be able to compensate 
the growth with respect to CO2 and noise. However, emissions of NOx and VOC will 
decrease, mainly due to improvements resulting from EU regulations (Feimann et al., 
2000). Besides, congestion levels are expected to increase unless a package of measures 
is introduced that exceeds, by far, current Dutch policies (AVV, 2000). The number of 
people killed in road accidents will probably decrease but remain on a level not much 
below the current one. The Dutch government’s target, as proposed in the recently 
rejected draft National Traffic and Transport Plan (NVVP) was a reduction of road 
deaths in 2010 to 750. Summarising, transport-related external effects will remain 
important in the next decades. External effects constitute an important reason for 
government intervention and resulting transport policy. In this paper, our main focus 
will be on environmental effects. 
 
To reduce environmental impacts of transport several technical an non-technical 
measures are available. Innovations and the related innovation system play an important role in transport in general and in reducing its environmental impact. Following on from 
Metcalfe (1995, Smits and Kuhlmann (2002) define the innovation system as: 
A system of innovations is that set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually 
contributes to the development and diffusion of new technologies, and which provides 
the framework within which governments form and implement policies to influence the 
innovation process. As such it is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store 
and transfer the knowledge, skills and artefacts which define new technologies. 
 
This definition applies to technology-related innovations. In this paper, we will take a 
broader stand to include non-technology related innovations, such as innovations in 
services or policy instruments.Though the list is not complete, categories of innovations 
in transport that are often discussed are:  
•  Other transport systems that might, at least partly, replace current road vehicles, 
ships, rail and aircraft. The introduction of new systems takes several decades, the  
last “new” technique being aircraft, which started playing a role between the first 
and second world wars. 
•  Improvements in current types of vehicles, fuels and infrastructures. 
•  Radical changes in transport services. 
•  Incremental changes in transport services. 
•  Application of existing concepts to new markets or in other geographical areas. 
•  Innovations in policy instruments. 
 
We will focus here on innovations that have been implemented in practice, trying for 
each case to identify crucial success factors and possible failure factors that have been 
successfully dealt with or that may still cause problems in the future. In some cases, the 
role of research has been the subject of study. The aim was to learn lessons for both 
policy and research. The results did not come from long-term scientific research using 
advanced methods, but were based on interviews with experts and accompanied by a 
limited literature survey. Experts interviewed were consultants and people working for 
independent institutes. We want to stimulate discussion on innovations in transport and 
the related role of research, rather than to provide a blueprint for innovations and related 
research and policies. 
 Systemic instruments are dealt with in section 2, while section 3 describes the cases, 
including actors involved, success and failure factors and the role of research. Finally, 
section 4 presents the main conclusions and discusses the results. 
 
2.  The systemic instruments 
Starting from the co-evolutionary development of innovation practice, theory and 
policy, Smits and Kuhlmann (2002) identify five functions playing a crucial role in the 
management of present-day innovation processes: 
1.  management of interfaces Not only aims at transferring knowledge but also at 
building bridges and stimulating the debate. Furthermore, the management of 
interfaces is not limited to bilateral contracts but also focuses on chains, networks 
and the system level. 
2.  (de-)constructing and organising systems. Construct and de-construct (sub) systems, 
initiate and organise, use  discourse, alignment and consensus. ilitation of prime 
movers and ensuring that all relevant actors are involved also form part of this 
function. 
3.  providing a platform for learning and experimenting. Create conditions for various 
forms of learning such as learning by doing, learning by using, learning by 
interacting and learning at system level. 
4.  providing an infrastructure for strategic intelligence. Identify sources (technology 
assessment, foresight, evaluation, bench-marking), build links between sources, 
improve accessibility for all relevant actors and stimulate the development of 
capacity to produce strategic information tailored to the needs of actors involved. 
5. stimulating  demand  articulation,  strategy and vision development. Stimulate and 
facilitate the search for possible applications, develop instruments that support 
discourse, vision and strategy development. 
 
The authors conclude that, in reality, financial instruments have been dominant. They 
state that a new type of instrument, the systemic one, should be included, more to better 
attune the instrument portfolio to the needs of actors involved in innovation processes 
than previously. In the case studies we will try to answer the question if systemic 
instruments have played a role in the policy-making process and in the related research. 
In the interviews we asked about the  general success and failure factors and about the 
impact of research on the process. 3. Cases 
Cases were selected using three criteria: 
•  Dutch and non-Dutch cases were to be included; 
•  Both technical and non-technical (services) cases were to be included; 
•  Services should be related to passenger transport, because the impact of 
governments on passenger transport is much greater than on goods transport. 
 
In the interviews we asked for the perceptions of interviewees on a descritpion, goals, 
results, success and failure factors, the role of research, the impact on decision making 
and the role of systemic instruments. We did not focus on the research reports 
themselves. Therefore it is possible that the research report focused on aspects that the 
persons interviewed did not mention. The idea behind this approach is that if the person 
interviewed does not mention these aspects, they have probably not been of importance 
in the process. However, further research into these documents might add value to our 
approach. 
 
Park-and-ride at the edge of town for shopping in the centre 
Description 
Since 1994 some cities and towns have introduced park-and-ride facilities on the edge 
of town, the so-called transferia (transfer points). Some of them are successful, others 
are not. In this paper we will focus on the successful transferia, introduces to bring 
people from outside town in the centre. The main example is the transfer point on the 
east side of Utrecht. Other examples are found in the cities of Den Bosch and 
Dordrecht. Note that in Utrecht there is also a transfer point on the west side, but it is 
not successful. The transfer point on the east side of Utrecht focuses on people going to 
the city centre for shopping. Coming from outside town on Thursday night when the 
shops are open and on Saturdays, people can park their cars on the east side of town, at 
the parking lot of the soccer club, FC Utrecht. The few times a year when the shops in 
Utrecht centre are open on Sundays, the P+ R (park-and-ride) service is also available. 
Before this, that  parking lot was (almost) empty. A bus brings the people to the centre. 
In the beginning the service was free but now people have to pay. A combined ticket for 
parking and the return trip by bus is cheaper than parking in the city centre. Introducing 
paid parking has not led to any noticeable decline the number of users.  
 Actors involved 
The service is an initiative of the local municipality of Utrecht, the local bus company 
(GVU) offers the service and is paid for by the municipality. Thought the initiative and 
general concept originated in the local municipality, the concept was worked out in 
detail in cooperation  with the GVU. 
 
Goals 
The main goal was not as much to reduce traffic and congestion on the routes from the 
east to the centre, as it was to reduce parking problems. The service is a much cheaper 
alternative for the municipality than building new parking garages in (or near) the 
centre.  
 
Success and failure factors 
An important factor for the success is the price: it is lower than the alternative of 
parking in the centre. A second factor is the ease and comfort compared to the 
alternative: driving into the centre and finding a parking place, which is often very 
difficult due to congestion and a lack of parking places. A third success factor is the 
quality of the service. Important elements are the high speed of the bus (short travel 
time), the high frequency, the surveillance at the parking lot and the continual presence 
of a bus waiting at the parking place. People arriving by car therefore can always 
immediately enter the bus where the driver is waiting. Therefore people experience the 
service as being safe.  A final important success factor is the publicity given to service 
through several means, making it well known.  
A possible thread for success is the need for permanent subsidies. Another possible 
thread for success is maintaining the information and reputation built up in the past. 
Before introducing the service the importance of information was recognised by the 
actors. The positive reputation is partly the result of a positive attitude of the local press 
(e.g. the regional newspaper Utrechts Nieuwsblad).  
 
Research 
The only research that was carried out in advance was the inventory carried out by the 
municipality about the introduction of the concept in other places like Bruges 
(Belgium), York and Oxford  (UK) and what was learned from the successes and 
failures. No specific research for Utrecht was carried out. After introducing the service investigations were carried out periodically by a consultant on behalf of the 
municipality, focusing on the opinions (how to improve the service) and behaviour of 
users. This research showed that some of the users had not visited Utrecht centre before 
the service, but had gone instead to neighbouring towns or shopping centres in the 
outskirts of town. The investigations also showed that the service was working well.  
 
Systemic instruments 
Marketing has played an important role in the success of the service. Besides, the 
desires and needs of (potential) customers were given the main focus. Several categories 
of customers were recognised and the service was adapted to these categories. 
Communication between the municipality, the GVU and the soccer club FC Utrecht, 
and between the municipality and the public has also played an important role.  
 
Park-and-ride near a tourist village 
Description 
Renesse is a small town on the coast in the southwest of the Netherlands. In the summer 
season it attracts many tourists to the town or the beach. People driving through town, 
often searching for a parking place, and parked vehicles caused many problems. In the 
mid-nineties a parking place was laid on just outside town. Buses and a horse tram 
brought people to the village for free. There is also a route followed to the entrances of 
the beaches, and the main camping sites were on the same route. Camping guests can 
also use the bus to go to the village or to the beaches. The timetable also fits well to the 
timetable of the regional bus, making a switch very easy for the users. Some buses have 
been adapted to the customers being almost exclusively tourists. For example, one of 
the old buses has  the roof removed (giving a convertible feeling). Most of the interior 
of the bus has been taken out, there is sand on the floor to give people a “beachy 
feeling”. There also is a horse tram as  tourist attraction. Some hybrid mini-buses are 
also used. In the dunes they ride on electricity. Both supply and demand have increased 
since the introduction of this service.  
 
Actors involved 
The initiative came from the local municipality, which finances the yearly costs  (about 
135,000 euro); the Ministry of Transport subsidised initial costs. At the time of writing 
this paper there is was discussion on the yearly costs. Users may be obliged to pay in the future; firms in the village benefitting from the service may pay (part of) the costs. 
Initially it was not legally possible to have firms pay part of the costs, but the national 
legal system has been changed to make this possible. The hybrid mini-buses are partly 
subsidised by NOVEM, a government related institute responsible for such items as 
subsidising energy and environment-related projects. 
 
Goals 
The main goal was to free the village from car traffic (driving and parking).  
 
Success and failure factors 
An important success factor is the free service offered; other success factors are the 
positive image of the service and the fact that it is well known all over the country. 
Another factor is the marketing: it was not sold as “public transport” but as the last 
section of the car trip. Part of the success is also due to related measures: reducing the 
number of parking places in the village at the same time as introducing the service and 
introducing car-free streets.  
 
One of the threads is the need to subsidise the service. Introducing a fee will cause legal 
problems: then users should be given a ticket but the ticketing machine is not in the 




Before the introduction of the service a consultant carried out research on behalf of the 
municipality, focusing on the market potential and choice of transport mode of possible 
users. Because of the pilot character the Ministry of Transport claimed that periodic 
research had to be carried out, focusing mainly on the number of users. This research 
did not have much impact as it did not focus on other aspects than the number of users. 
 
Evaluation carried out by a consultant shows that many users use the service frequently. 
It also shows that some tourists actually chose Renesse instead of other villages because 
of this service. 
 Systemic instruments 
Again, the impact of marketing has been large. Making the users the central issue of the 
concept has been very important. Finally, combining the introduction of the service with 
the other policies related to parking in the village and car-free zones played an 
important role in the success. 
 
Temporarily limited access on a route through a small town 
Description 
The region of Utrecht inaccessible from the south of the country by the A2 motorway. 
During the morning peak the A2 in the direction of Utrecht (north) is heavily congested. 
Many car drivers therefore took an alternative route via the small town of Vianen, and 
returned to the A2 north of Vianen, leading to much congestion and nuisance on that 
route. The complete section within the built-up area used to be congested during the 
morning peak hours, leading to safety problems, noise nuisance and parents who did not 
allow their children to go to school unaccompanied. It was therefore decided to limit 
access in one direction. The final decision was for a system that would limit access of 
vehicles coming from the south. A closed cordon of seven locations would regulate the 
traffic. In 1997 when Vianen introduced the concept, it was the first town in the 
Netherlands to do so. Note, however, that the discussion had started around 1988, with 
the first research dating back to 1990. In 2000 the system was also introduced 




The initiative came from the local municipality. One person playing an important role 
was the alderman for transport. Later on the Dept of Public Works (RWS in Dutch)  for 
the  province of Utrecht (a section of the Ministry of Transport responsible for the roads 
in the province) got involved. RWS realised the problem was the result of problem on 
the A2 motorway. Another important actor was the fire brigade: during the morning 
peak it was impossible for them to extinguish a fire, simply because destinations were 
more or less inaccessible due to the congestion. RWS offered to pay part of the costs on 
the condition that the local municipality accepted that access to the north of town to the 
motorway would be limited. Though the municipality did not like the proposal initially, 
later on it became acceptable to them. Because of the limited access of traffic coming from the south the inhabitants of Vianen would not have to wait so long after the 
introduction of limited access to the motorway north of town. RWS promised that the 
limited access would only be introduced during periods of congestion on the A2. One 
can consider the combined measures as a package deal.  
 
Goals 
The goal was to improve liveability and safety and to reduce congestion in Vianen  
during the morning peak. 
 
Success and failure factors 
An important success factor was the magnitude of the problem: everybody, including 
the inhabitants and firms in Vianen and the politicians of the various political parties 
agreed that the problem should be solved. Convincing people from outside the area was 
relatively easy: people of RWS and others who saw the video tape and the results of 
research (see below) were easily convinced that the old situation was unacceptable. The 
video tape certainly added to the result of the research. Another important success factor 
was the crucial role of the chairperson of the transport department  of the municipality. 
Another success factor was due to the route not being completely closed but allowing 
limited access. Firstly, the plan was to completely close the route. Then some people 
claimed they should be exempted. This, for example, was the case for people living in 
the village of Lexmond, just south of Vianen. They would, of course, suffer from a 
closure. It was decided not to close the route but to limit access. Only a limited number 
of cars may enter Vianen from the south. This number is low enough to avoid the 
problems but high enough to allow people living just south of Vianen to drive to the A2 
via Vianen. Also for legal reasons limited access is easier to implement than a closure. 
The people responsible for the system also have more flexibility in case of limited 
access compared to a closure. For example, they can easily adapt the time period of 
limited access. Limited access is regulated by a traffic light that allows one car at a time 
to drive on and proceed through Vianen.  
 
Research 
To convince the RWS and the Ministry of Transport research was carried out by a 
consultant on behalf of the local municipality. It was a study to show the magnitude of 
the problem. Number plates of cars were registered both at the start and finish of the alternative route via Vianen. The study showed that during the morning peak 95% of all 
cars entering Vianen via the south were cars that had left the A2, choosing the 
alternative route via Vianen and then entering the A2 again. Another study was carried 
out to determine the impact of the additional limited access north of town, as proposed 
by RWS. The result convinced the local municipality that problems for inhabitants 
would be limited. Not really the traditional form of research, but interesting was the 
video made by a consultant on behalf of the municipality showing the problems. Not 
only did one see the congested route but also the impossibility of the fire brigade to 
leave the garage and drive to a possible destination.  
 
Systemic instruments 
The role of systemic instruments in this case is limited. The video tape played an 
important role, as well as the chairperson of the transport department who personally 
put much energy in the project by successfully speaking and dealing with other actors.  
 
Reducing emissions of motor vehicles by EU regulations 
Description 
Emissions of NOx, VOC, CO and lead from road transport in EU countries have 
decreased. For example, between 1991 and 1998 road transport emissions of NOx 
decreased in the EU-15 by approximately 20%, despite the growth in vehicle 
kilometres. These reductions are mainly the result of EU regulations for cars and fuels 
(EEA, 2001). For example, the three-way catalytic converter was introduced to meet the 
1993 standards for new cars. Lead was banned not only because of the health impact, 
but also because lead ruins catalytic converters.  
 
Actors involved 
Important actors are the European Commission, the EU member states and the 
manufacturers of cars and fuels. Negotiations between these (categories of) actors are 
very important for the final result. 
 
Goals 
The goal was to reduce the emissions of pollutants and so the negative impacts of 
transport on the environment. 
 Success and failure factors 
An important success factor is the long tradition of regulations. The first regulations for 
cars originated in 1970. Practice shows that introducing new regulations replacing 
previous regulations is relatively easy, easier than introducing new regulations for 
vehicle categories that were not regulated before. This partly explains that only recently 
have regulations for barges been introduced, though reducing emissions from these 
ships is more cost-effective than further emissions reductions for road transport. The 
role of industry is very important. Thanks to numerous negotiations the regulations 
could be introduced successfully. Negotiations dealt mainly with the time of 
introduction, the emissions standards and the test procedure. However, the strong 
impact of industry resulted in lower standards or later introduction of standards than 
was technically possible. For example, the regulations for cars that were introduced in 
1993 were more or less equivalent to regulations introduced in California in 1983. 




Research in separate member states shows that expected effects and costs have played 
an important role with respect to the position of these member states. The Auto Oil 
programmes, in which the car and fuel industries also participate, have been influential 
at the EU level. These programmes focus on costs, effects and cost-effectiveness of new 
techniques for vehicles and fuels. 
 
Systemic instruments 
The role of systemic instruments is limited: the traditional approach of research into 
costs and effects, as well as negotiations between the EU, member states and industry 
dominates. These negotiations can be seen as systemic instruments. 
 
Porous pavements on motorways 
Description 
Since 1987 porous asphalt has been applied on motorways in the Netherlands. The first 
experiments (small test sections on motorways) originated in the late seventies. The 
initial reason was safety: during rain or wet-surface conditions visibility is much better 
compared to the traditional asphalt pavements. A little later it became clear that the level of noise emissions from road traffic driving on porous asphalt is lower than of 
road traffic driving on regular asphalt. By the year 2000 over 50% of all motorways had 
porous asphalt. If motorways need new pavement this new pavement will be porous. 
Therefore by the year 2010 the complete Dutch motorway network is expected to have 
porous asphalt. The share in the Netherlands is higher than in any other EU country. In 
Europe as whole the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland lead the other EU countries 
in taking measures to reduce noise nuisance. 
 
Apart from porous pavement a second new type of pavement is under discussion at the 
moment. This is double-layered porous pavement, which has even better acoustical 
characteristics.  
 
Porous pavement and double-layered porous pavement can also be applied to local 
roads. But additional costs are then higher compared to additional costs if applied to 
motorways due to the high costs of draining off the water. Besides this, double-layered 
asphalt cannot be applied in curves and if speeds vary greatly (e.g. near traffic lights), 
speed variations (accelerating and decelerating road vehicles) will cause surface 
problems. In this paper we will focus on porous pavement on motorways. 
 
Actors involved 
Two actors have been main contributers to the applications of porous pavement: firstly, 
the RWS, the part of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of the motorway network, for example, and secondly, the 
firms manufacturing pavements, and constructing and maintaining roads. It is the 
interaction between the two that have led to the successful introduction of porous 
asphalt. The firms developed the new pavements for commercial reasons, and the RWS 
liked the better visibility (and therefore safety) as well as the acoustic characteristics. 
 
Recently the Dutch Ministry of the Environment introduced a subsidy for local 
governments for doubly-layered porous pavement in which the Ministry would pay the 
additional costs. The subsidy is very successful: the total amount in subsidies exceeding 
by far the available amount of money. 
 Goals 
The initial goal was to improve safety by improving visibility, but  noise reduction was 
soon added. 
 
Success and failure factors 
An important success factor is the relatively low additional cost compared to traditional 
pavements. Additional costs including both construction and maintenance, are 
approximately 25 to 30% if applied on motorways. Another success factor is the 
positive contribution to two aspects: safety and noise. A problem for doubly layered 
porous pavements is the filth which fills the spaces in the asphalt, reducing the positive 
effects. The discussion on how to solve the problems is still going on.  
 
A thread for porous asphalt is the application of salt to slippery pavement, which 
lengthens the braking time of the car compared to braking on regular asphalt. This 
problem was solved by developing and applying other types of salts. 
 
Research 
The asphalt firms carried out much research and also paid for research carried out by 
consultants on test sections on motorways. They also carried out research aiming to 
develop salt types that do not lead to longer braking distances. In some cases RWS paid 
part of the costs. Research was carried out by a consultant on behalf of the Ministry of 
the Environment on the cost-effectiveness of porous pavements (KPMG, 1999). The 
research supported the long existing policy to prioritise measures at the source 
(vehicles, infrastructure) instead of at the intermediate zone (noise barriers) or the 
receptors (construction of buildings). 
 
Apart from these researches the impact of research has been limited. 
 
Systemic instruments 
The role of systemic instruments has been very limited. The interaction between RWS 
and the asphalt firms can be categorised as systemic. The innovation also followed the 
more or less traditional lines. New markets for public transport at the regional level 
Most western countries face a decline in the market share of public transport. Besides 
this,  often substantial subsidies are needed to maintain current public transport. Despite 
this poor market position many cities and regions have made plans to improve local or 
regional public transport. In the past decade especially light-rail based concepts have 
been subject of study all over the world. However, the number of implementations of 
new public transport concepts, such as light rail, has been relatively limited. This raises 
the question about the factors that have resulted in successful implementation in those 
cities and regions. Cervero (1999) carried out research using 12 cases from around the 
world to answer this question. Several lessons can be learned from his research: 
Visioning: transit metropolises evolve from well-articulated visions of the future. There 
must be a sense of exactly what the target is, both to gain public buy-in and to build 
political support. However, in pluralist societies, striking common vision can be 
difficult. 
Visionaries: visions need visionaries who can articulate what the future might hold and 
convince others of a desired course of action. Many transit metropolises have benefited 
from inspired leadership. Efficient institutions and governance: efficient institutional 
structures and regional forms of governance that promote the close co-ordination of 
transportation and land use are very important. 
Pro-active planning and urban management: transit-supportive built forms are 
substantially the result of farsighted, pro-active and strategic planning processes. 
Viable centres: all transit metropolises maintain strong, vibrant central business 
districts. 
Balanced development and traffic flows: to avoid unidirectional, radial movements into 
a dominant centre, intermixing land uses along linear corridors, can produce efficient bi-
directional lows.  
Competition and an entrepreneurial ethos: Cervero found elements of competition in 
many successful transit metropolises. Competition not only contains costs and rewards 
efficiency but also spurs on service innovations, something that is badly needed in many 
suburban travel markets. 
Giving transit priority: it is especially important to make transit time competitive with 
the time travelled by private car.  
Small is beautiful: Large-scale mega-projects are not necessarily the only means of 
creating a successful transit metropolis. In several cases, many of the successes are attributable to the cumulative effects of many modest, low-cost, but fast-turnaround 
actions. 
Urban design: cities for people and places: a design philosophy of most transit 
metropolises is that cities are for people, not for cars. Parts of the centres have been 
given to pedestrians and sometimes also cyclists. 
Auto equalisers: many metropolises have matched provisions for pedestrians, cyclists 
and transit users with restraints on motoring and auto ownership. 
Hierarchical and integrated transit: many of the successful transit metropolises feature 
well-designed hierarchical forms of transit services. This makes it possible to provide 
good quality public transport for many origin-destination combinations. 
Flexibility: especially for some of the smaller transit metropolises, bus-based 
technologies not only reduce capital outlays but also provide important flexibility 
advantages. Flexibility is probably easier to include in bus-based systems than in rail-
based systems. 
 
This overview shows that some of the crucial factors are related to the transport system 
itself (good integration with land-use planning, adequate networks, car-free sections etc. 
But some of the factors are more related to processes and to systemic instruments: 
visions and visionaries as well as competition and an entrepreneurial ethos have proven 
to be important factors. Cervero also concludes that successful cases support larger 
policy objectives: sustainability, accessibility, liveability, social diversity, 
entrepreneurship and the broadening of choices to do with where and how people live 
and travel. In short, many factors are relevant and many actors are involved for the 
successful implementation of public transport on a regional scale. Therefore it is very 
complex to successfully implement public transport at this level. 
 
Innovations in the role of research for policy making 
In 1997 / 1998 the Dutch government decided that part of the natural gas revenues 
should be invested in the country in such a way that future generations would benefit. 
The goal of the investment was to improve the quality of life in the Netherlands in a 
very broad sense, i.e., satisfying all kinds of economic, social and quality-of-life goals. 
Some 7 to 9 billion euro was to be reserved for these investments for the 1999-2010 
period. All investments were to be additional to the investments that resulted from 
current policy. The ministries proposed plans for about 22 billion euro. In order to support decision making, a pragmatic method was developed to evaluate the plans. Very 
different kinds of investment plans were evaluated for economic, social, and ecological 
impacts and direct links were made with the policy-making process.  Proposals included 
roads, public transport investments and many non-transport related plans such as 
improving the environmental quality or the vitality of large cities. A central government 
advisory committee (the ICES) asked four Dutch national research institutes 
(Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis [CPB], Social and Cultural Planning 
Bureau [SCP], National Institute for Public Health and the Environment [RIVM] and 
the Transport Research Centre of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management [AVV] to evaluate these plans (CPB, 1998). The institutes were asked to 
develop a general appraisal method and rank the investment proposals on the basis of 
this method. All the plans were labelled as (a) “a solid plan” , (b) “possibly a solid plan 
but requiring improvements” (upgradable) or (c) “a weak plan”. The method developed 
is, in itself, not new, but it certainly is of interest for the following five reasons: 
1.  Very different kinds of investment plans were evaluated using this method 
2.  Not only economic impacts were evaluated but also social and ecological impacts 
3.  Effects of investments were compared with effects of other policy instruments 
4.  Use of the method has been directly linked to a policy-making process, and 
5.  The study was carried out by independent institutes. 
 
The methodology consists of three steps. In the first step policy tasks were identified on 
the basis of prognosis of future developments and policy goals. In the second steps, 
each individual investment plan was evaluated using several criteria: legitimacy, 
benefits, cost-effectiveness, uncertainties and risks,  and alternatives. In the third step 
different combinations of policy measures were evaluated.  
 
It is not within the scope of this paper to present the results. For a summary we refer to 
Annema et al. (1999). What is important is that this research was new and innovative 
for the five above-mentioned reasons. Also important is that part of the money was 
earmarked for research. Several research programme proposals were evaluated and 
several chosen. For transport two institutes are of particular interest: Connekt, which 
aims to bring together market-based actors (such as the car industry or the companies 
providing public transport) with the government and researchers, and Habiforum, 
focusing on multiple land use (e.g. building above infrastructure).  
Another important aspect is the large impact the study had on decision making. All 
“solid plans” were selected, the total cost amounting to 5.5 billion Euro. There was was 
about 3.6 billion euro left, which was used for a selection of “upgradable” plans. No 
weak plans were selected. 
 
This example shows the importance research can have on decision making. The 
innovative character comes from the co-operation of institutes, and of the concept of 
evaluating all kinds of different proposals in a consistent way. The participation of the 
ministries developing the proposals in the process also formed an innovative approach. 
 
4.  Conclusions and discussion 
In the past two decades reductions in transport emissions have mainly resulted from 
technical changes in vehicles and fuels. At the level of the transport system the 
innovations cannot be considered radical, while at the level of components of the 
system, radical innovations were introduced, the three-way catalytic converter being a 
dominant one. The technical changes are mainly the result of EU regulations for fuels 
and vehicles. The role of systemic instruments has not been very dominant in setting 
new standards. Nevertheless, one can consider the scene to be systemic, where there are 
formal and informal contacts between policy makers at the EU, and national level and 
industry.  
Changes in the provision of public transport have played only a limited role in emission 
reductions on a national scale. The contribution of innovations in public transport 
services to national emission reductions has been more limited. Nevertheless, they can 
play an important role at the regional scale, contributing to fewer local emissions, and a 
more attractive local environment. Successful cases often not only include changes in 
public transport but in a reduction of the possibilities for car use and an improvement of 
facilities for slow modes. It is very difficult to draw general conclusions for success 
factors for innovations in transport services. The case studies as described in this paper 
are, of course, too limited in number and therefore can only serve as illustrations and 
lead to general conclusions. However, some tentative conclusions can be given: 
 
Firstly, the services described can certainly result in local improvements in nuisance 
from parked and driven vehicles, noise and air pollution. Secondly, the local municipalities have played an important role in the introduction of the new services. 
Thirdly, in some cases the role of only one person (or a few persons) had a huge impact 
in the introduction of the services. Fourthly, in several cases the solution was not as 
much in expensive, high-tech measures, but in very simple but creative ways of using 
existing possibilities, e.g. the park-and-ride service for shopping in Utrecht using an 
existing parking lot. The service itself does not involve much more than offering a 
parking place and a bus to the centre. Fifthly, the role of research differs considerably 
among the innovations, sometimes being of crucial importance, but sometimes hardly 
relevant. Sixth, all functions that play a crucial role in the management of present-day 
innovation processes, as presented by Smits and Kuhlmann (2002), appear in some 
cases, though not in all cases. The management of interfaces brought actors together. 
The organising systems often did not exist before. Learning and experimenting plaid an 
important role in several cases. The demand articulation was very important in some of 
the cases: the services were organised starting from the perspective of the users. The 
role of providing an infrastructure for strategic intelligence in the cases has been 
limited.  
 
In the case of the Dutch proposals for investments (“ICES”), the role of research was 
crucial: it has dominated decision-making. The relatively simple methodology, 
including a broad evaluation of all investments on economic, ecological and social 
aspects, and the interaction with policy makers, has proven to be successful. 
For policy makers we have the impression that creative use of relatively simple 
“solutions” may prove very successful. The goals of a project should also be very 
explicit and communicated very well with relevant actors, sometimes including the 
public. Thirdly, services should  be centred on the  (present or possible) users.  
 
With regard to research our impression is that at the level of individual innovations the 
role in the process should be very clear. In many cases multidisciplinary research is 
preferred above mono-disciplinary research.  
 
At the level of innovations in transport, in general, it should be noted that our paper 
only presents a limited number of cases. More research into the success and failure 
factors for innovations is needed to be able to draw general conclusions on innovations 
in transport. Besides this, failures as well as successes should be studied. References 
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